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THE ASCENDENCY OF LABOR-ARBITRATION AND THE
CONFUSION OF LABOR ARBITRATORS: A CASE OF
CONGRESSIONAL NEGLECT
Introduction
Congressional and judicial efforts to facilitate the resolution of
labor disputes have been largely responsible for the easing of tensions
between employers and labor organizations. Judicial, administrative,
and arbitral procedures have been formulated to encourage, and
in many instances require the peaceful institutional settlement of
labor disputes. Both Congress and the courts have attempted to
define the respective roles of the dispute resolving bodies; and yet,
these roles are neither clear nor settled.
Recently the grievance-arbitration procedure, provided for in most
collective bargaining agreements, has become the primary method
for resolving labor disputes. The impetus for the increased utilization
of arbitration has been a series of judicial and administrative decisions
rendered over a 20 year period. The effect of these decisions has been
to require a potential litigant to exhaust the grievance-arbitration
procedure before asserting his claim in the courts or before the National
Labor Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as NLRB or the
Board].
This deference to arbitration has been rationalized with three
major policy explanations. First, Congress has expressed a preference
for the private settlement of labor disputes through the grievance-
arbitration procedure. Second, arbitration is the more efficient method
for resolving labor disputes, since the Board and the courts are now
overburdened with labor related litigation. Third, the arbitrator has
a better knowledge of the law of the shop, which imbues him with
greater competency in dealing with labor disputes.
Despite these explanations reliance upon the grievance-arbitration
process encounters substantial resistance in many quarters. The
purpose of this note will be to examine the cases and statutes per-
taining to labor arbitration. Part I will deal with the historical back-
ground of labor-arbitration in the federal courts. Part II will be
concerned with the limits and restrictions imposed upon an arbitrator's
power. A brief description of the arbitrator as a breed and as a
human being, allegedly expert in the law of the shop, will ensue in
Part III. Finally, it is hoped that a policy of arbitration can be formu-
lated that will be consistent with our societal goals of economic well-




A. Development of Section 301 Actions to Enforce Collective
Bargaining Agreements.
Any discussion of the role of arbitration in the resolution of labor
disputes should begin with Section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, as amended [hereinafter referred to as the Act or the
Taft-Hartley Act].' The Supreme Court's first interpretation of Section
301 came in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp.2 Petitioner-union filed suit in federal district
court pursuant to Section 301 seeking enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements between it and the respondent-employer. The
union alleged that the company had failed to pay employees repre-
sented by the union their full salary for a certain period of time as
required by the collective bargaining agreements. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the Court, said that this was a peculiarly individual
dispute between the aggrieved employees and the company, and
"[n]owhere in the legislative history did Congress discuss or show
any recognition of the type of suit involved here, in which the union
is suing on behalf of employees for accrued wages."3 The Court
further held that employees are empowered to enforce individual
rights in the state courts.4
I Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §
185 (1970) provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce, as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer
whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be
bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and
against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual
member or his assets.
2 348 U.S. 487 (1955).
3 Id. at 461.
4 See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 871 U.S. 195 (1962) which held that
an employee could maintain a suit against his employer for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement between his union and the employer pursuant to Section 301
of the Act. The Court noted that the Westinghouse proscription against suits filed
pursuant to Section 801 to vindicate employees' personal rights is no longer
authoritative as precedent. Id. at 199.
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In Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,5 the
Supreme Court withdrew from this narrow construction of Section
301. There, the petitioner-union sought enforcement of the arbitration
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the District Court's order re-
quiring the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions, holding
that the strict procedural requirements of Section 7 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act6 relating to the issuance of injunctions in labor dis-
putes need not apply to the federal district court's enforcement of
arbitration provisions pursuant to Section 301. 7 Most significantly, the
Court held that Section 301 confers subject-matter jurisdiction on the
federal district courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements;
and that pursuant to this jurisdiction the federal courts may fashion
a body of substantive common law to apply to suits arising under
Section 301.8 In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Burton distinguished
the Westinghouse case by commenting that arbitration provisions are
for union controversies falling within the ambit of Section 301 whereas
Westinghouse dealt with the peculiarly individual claims of accrued
back wages.9 This distinction, however, is attenuated since Justice
Frankfurter's decision in Westinghouse that the applicable substantive
law in suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements is the state
law,'0 was overruled by the Lincoln Mills holding that federal com-
mon law is the substantive law to be applied.
In Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court commented that Congress,
through Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,1 has expressed its
preference for arbitration as the most desirable means for settling
labor disputes.12 That Section "denies injunctive relief to any person
who has failed to make 'every reasonable effort' to settle the dispute
by negotiation, mediation or voluntary arbitration." The Court found
reinforcement for this interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
Sections 301(a)-(b) of the Act. Holding that Section 301(b) "pro-
vides the procedural remedy lacking at common law"'13 for a union to
5 353 U.S. 448 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Lincoln Mills]. See also Goodall-
Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of America, 353 U.S. 550 (1957) and
General Electric Co. v. Local 205, IUE, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
6 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
7 353 U.S. at 458, 459.
8 Id. at 454-56.
0 Id. at 460.
103 48 U.S. at 449.
"129 U.S.C. § 109 (1970).
12 353 U.S. at 458.
13 Id. at 451.
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sue or be sued as an entity in the federal courts, the Court construed
Section 301 (a) as necessarily going beyond the mere grant of subject-
matter jurisdiction.14 An analysis of the legislative history led the
Court to conclude that Congress intended Section 301(a) to be the
basis upon which federal courts could fashion substantive law. Vested
with this power to formulate substantive law, the Court then construed
Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the legislative history of
Section 301 as requiring the courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate.
Lincoln Mills instilled fear in many that the Court would establish
its own law governing employer-union relations instead of encouraging
labor disputants to settle their problems by their own negotiated
terms.15 Such a situation would seriously undermine the policy favor-
ing freedom of contract and its corollary, industrial democracy.' In
1960 the Supreme Court dispelled many of these fears in three land-
mark cases popularly known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. Therein,
certain tests were enunciated to guide the district courts in suits to
enforce arbitration pursuant to Section 301 of the Act.
In United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing
Co.17 the Supreme Court held that in actions to enforce arbitration
brought pursuant to Section 301, the federal district courts are limited
to deciding whether a dispute involving an alleged violation of a
substantive provision of a contract in fact exists.'" If so, the court
is bound to enforce the arbitration agreement. The majority opinion
emphasized that grievances submitted to arbitration are to be judged
solely on whether they describe a violation of the contract, regardless
of their merit.19 The Supreme Court further reinforced Lincoln Mills
by citing Section 203(d) of the Act20 as authority for the congressional
preference for arbitration. 21
In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co.22 the Supreme Court added substance to American Manu-
facturing by establishing a guideline that doubts regarding the ap-
14 Id. at 455.
15 Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CA=.
L. REv. 663, 688 (1973).
16 See Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doe.
No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 991-1011, 7657-81 (1916).
17' 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
18 Id. at 568.
19 Id.
2029 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970) provides in part:
Final Adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement.
21 363 U.S. at 566.
22363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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plication of the contract to a particular dispute are to be "resolved in
favor of coverage."23 Arbitration must be compelled unless the dispute
was expressly excluded from those disputes which are covered by the
arbitration clause.
24
Finally, in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp.25 the Supreme Court limited the power of the federal
district courts to review an arbitral award to determining whether the
arbitrator's decision was based upon the contract.26 The court cannot
reverse the award merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator's
interpretation of the contract. Furthermore, the court cannot refuse
to enforce an ambiguous award merely because the ambiguity "per-
mits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his au-
thority."27
The Steelworkers Trilogy reaffirmed the policy favoring private
settlement of labor disputes. By severely restricting the courts' power
to review arbitral awards and by narrowly limiting those cases where
a court could refuse to enforce arbitration, the Supreme Court upheld
the policy that the collective agreement establishes "a system of in-
dustrial self-government."2 8 Industrial democracy has been preserved
and the fears that judicial intrusion into labor disputes would erode
the private nature of the labor contract have been dispelled.
2 9
Following the Steelworkers Trilogy the Supreme Court decided a
number of cases which further illuminate the expansive nature of the
arbitration policy. In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.30 the
Supreme Court faced an appeal from the Washington Supreme Court
which had held that an employer could recover damages from a union
where the union called a strike over a dispute contractually required
to be arbitrated.8' Even absent an express no-strike clause, arbitration
was the proper method for settling the dispute.32 The Court noted
that the agreement to arbitrate was the only remedy available to a
disputant under this contract, and unilateral action, such as a strike
23 Id. at 582-83.
241d. at 584-85.
28363 U.S. 593 (1960).
26 Id. at 598.
27 Id.
28363 U.S. at 580.
29 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAsv. L. RE-v.
999, 1024 (1955).
303 69 U.S. 95 (1962).
3' 856 P.2d I (Wash. 1960).32 1t bad been assumed in Lincoln Mills and in the Steelworkers Trilogy that
an agreement by the employer to arbitrate was the quid pro quo for an agreement
by the union not to strike during the life of a collective bargaining agreement.
Without an express no-strike clause some felt that an agreement to arbitrate was
an unenforceahBe executory agreement. Here, however, this theory is disspelled.
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or lockout, was precluded by the arbitration provision.33 To further
the policy of arbitration as a substitute for economic warfare, the
Supreme Court held that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute provides
the sole method for resolution of that dispute. Therefore, economic
warfare is waived by the parties when they have agreed to arbitrate,
and an employer can recover damages for breach of that agreement
3 4
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson35 the employer sought, inter
alia, to enjoin the union from striking where the contract contained
a no-strike clause and an agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising
under the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court
found that the strike violated the no-strike clause of the collective
bargaining agreement; however, the Court decided that it lacked
jurisdiction to enjoin the strike because Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions
in labor disputes.3 6 According to the Court, the Norris-LaGuardia
proscription against enjoining strikes and peaceful picketing had not
been narrowed by the subsequent enactment of Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act.37 They reasoned that if Congress had intended to
repeal Norris-LaGuardia, it would have done so expressly, and any
attempt to restrict Norris-LaGuardia by judicial construction of Section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act would therefore contravene the intent of
Congress.38
In Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers 9 the employer sued
the union for damages for encouraging a one-day strike in contra-
vention of the no-strike clause and the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement. The union moved to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration of the dispute. The Supreme Court
ruled that a stay was proper and that the collective bargaining
agreement required the employer to arbitrate his claim for damages.
40
Since the union denied it encouraged the strike, the employer was
not justified in seeking judicial rather than arbitral relief L41
3 369 U.S. at 104-05.
341d. at 106.
35 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
36 Id. at 203.
371d. at 203-05.
38Id. at 206-10.
39 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
40Id. at 267. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)
where an employer sued the union for damages Vursuant to Section 301 of the
Act. The Supreme Court held that the employers claim for damages need not
be submitted to arbitration because the arbitration clause of the collective
bargaining agreement was limited solely to submission of grievances by the em-
ployee or the union. No contractual provision conferred upon the employer the
right to submit grievances. Id. at 243.
41370 U.S. at 266.
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The result of these cases was to extend the coverage of Section 301
of Taft-Hartley to employer grievances and employer suits to compel
arbitration. Curiously, however, the Supreme Court did not face at
this point the contradiction that is created by its varying interpretations
of Norris-LaGuardia. In Lincoln Mills the Court justified its grant of
equitable relief by applying Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia which
expresses a preference for arbitration. In Sinclair Refining Co. how-
ever, the Court construed Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia as denying
the federal courts jurisdiction to enjoin strikes even where strikes
were prohibited by a no-strike clause and an agreement to arbitrate
in a collective bargaining agreement. Clearly, a policy of arbitration
is not advanced when a party may continue its strike or lock-out.
Although a remedy at law may exist for damages, there is no remedy
for the present violation of the contract. Consider the dilemma of a
small employer forced out of business because of a prolonged strike
in contravention of a no-strike clause who is subsequently unable to
collect damages from the union because it is judgment proof.
The Supreme Court resolved this difficulty in Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 77042 by expressly overruling that part
of Sinclair Refining Co. which held that Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia
prohibits federal courts from enjoining strikes by labor organizations
or employees in contravention of a no-strike clause where there is an
agreement to arbitrate. The Court noted that by denying an employer
injunctive relief in cases of this type, the federal policy favoring
arbitration would be undermined. The Supreme Court justified this
new construction of Section 4 of Norris-La Guardia by reasoning that
Section 4 was responsive to a situation where the federal courts
•.. were regarded as allies of management in its attempt to prevent
the organization and strengthening of labor unions; and in this
struggle the injunction became a potent weapon that was wielded
against the activities of labor groups.... Congressional emphasis
shifted from protection of the nascent labor movement to the en-
couragement of collective bargaining and to administrative tech-
niques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes.43
Pursuant to this change in congressional policy the Supreme Court in
Boys Markets held that Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia is inapplicable
in suits to enjoin strikes and enforce arbitration where the collective
bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause and an arbitration
provision.
42 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See also Comment, Labor-Relations-f 301(a) Labor-
Management Relations Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act-Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments-No Strike Clause, 59 Ky. LJ. 755 (1971).
43 398 U.S. at 250-51.
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B. Employee's Suits Under Section 801 and the Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation.
The preceding discussion has focused on the rights of the employer
and the union vis-a-vis each other. During the past decade, however,
the rights of employees vis-a-vis employers and unions have been the
source of considerable litigation under Section 301. The effect of these
cases on the arbitral process has been significant, not only in the
volume of cases arbitrated but also in terms of arbitral strategy.
The duty of an exclusive bargaining agent is to fully and fairly
represent the interests of all the employees impartially "subject always
to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion." 44 In Humphrey v. Moore45 the Supreme Court was faced
with a suit filed by a group of employees against its bargaining agent,
Teamsters Local 89, for breach of its duty of fair representation. The
union was the bargaining agent for employees of two companies
which performed similar services for the Ford Motor Company in
Louisville, Kentucky. Ford informed the two companies, E. & L.
Transport Co. and Dealers Transport Co., that it could not continue
to do business with both of them. Thereafter, E. & L. and Dealers
agreed that Dealers would continue to perform its services for Ford.
Pursuant to this agreement the union and the companies convened a
joint employer-employee committee to deal with the relative seniority
rights of the employees of the two companies. It was decided that
the seniority lists of the two companies would be dovetailed, which
caused some of Dealers' employees to be placed on lay-off status.
The affected Dealer's employees brought suit in state court to enjoin
implementation of the agreement. Their suit was dismissed, but the
Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and ordered
that a permanent injunction be issued.46 The Supreme Court reversed.
While noting that the committee was convened and empowered to
dovetail the seniority lists pursuant to the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the Court held that the union acted in good faith and did not
breach its duty of fair representation.47 The Court quoted from its
decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman:48
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which
the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
44 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
45375 U.S. 335 (1964).46 Moore v. Teamsters Local 89, 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962).
47 375 U.S. at 350-51.
48 Id. at 349.
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are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reason-
ableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.49
The doctrine enunciated in Humphrey v. Moore was expanded in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox.0 Maddox, a discharged employee,
sued Republic Steel in state court to recover severence pay provided
for in the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement also pro-
vided for mandatory arbitration of all disputes arising over the
interpretation and application of the contract. Judgment for Maddox
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama on the grounds that
state law did not require him to exhaust his contractual grievance
procedures.51  The Supreme Court reversed finding the specific
grievance was "not so different in kind as to justify an exception"
to the federal rule requiring exhaustion of contractual remedies before
suit may be brought.52 The Court based its holding on three policies,
as expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan:
Union interest in prosecuting employee grievances is clear. Such
activity complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining
representative by permitting it to participate actively in the con-
tinuing administration of the contract... Employer interests, for
their part, are served by limiting the choice of remedies to ag-
grieved employees. And it cannot be said, in the normal situation,
that contract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the
interests of an aggrieved employee until the employee has at-
tempted to implement the procedures and found them so.
53
Republic Steel parallels the Second Circuit's decision in Black
Clawson Company, Inc. v. IAM, Lodge 855, District 137, holding that
an individual employee cannot prosecute a grievance on his own
absent the contractual proviso expressly allowing such action.5 4 The
Court recognized that the right to arbitrate is not a right "incident
to the employer-employee relationship, but one which is incident to
the relationship between employer and union."55
Republic Steel, Black Clawson, and Smith v. Evening News As-
sociation56 clearly vest the right to arbitrate an employee grievance
with the employee's exclusive bargaining representative. The only
49 345 U.S. at 338.
G0 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
51 158 So.2d 492 (Ala. 1963).
523 79 U.S. at 654.
53 Id. at 653.
64 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 Id. at 184 citing Black-Clawson Co. v. Internatlional Ass'n of Machinists,
212 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
56 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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exception arises where the collective bargaining agreement expressly
provides that an employee may sue before exhausting his contractual
remedies or may personally implement the contract grievance pro-
cedures. Analytically, the union, as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, possesses the right to bargain with the employer on behalf of the
employee. Since collective bargaining is a continuing process, this
right does not cease upon the successful negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement, but continues throughout the life of the agree-
ment.
To ensure the protection of the employees' rights from negligent
or arbitrary union decisions not to arbitrate a grievance, the Supreme
Court held in Vaca v. Sipes57 that a union member could sue his union
and recover damages for the failure of the union to fairly represent
him. The Court also established the standard by which the courts
could determine whether a union has breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation. The Court recognized that
the individual employee has no absolute right to have his
grievance arbitrated under the collective bargaining agreement at
issue, and that a breach of the duty of fair representation is not
established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was
meritorious .... 58
The employee must prove "arbitrary or bad faith conduct on the part
of the union in processing his grievance." 59
5 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
58Id. at 195.
59Id. at 193. See also Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968)
where the Court of Appeals sustained the district court's dismissal of a suit against
the union for breach of the duty of fair representation, because the plaintiff failed
to pursue her intra-union remedies.
See Feller, supra note 15, at 813-14 where David Feller argues that the
Sixth Circuit's holding "is plainly erroneous. It imposes a bar based on a right rising
out of union membership to a suit in which membership is irrelevant and which
is based solely on employee status ..
Cf. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(4) (1970) which provides in pat
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any ad-
ministrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization
or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or
proceeding . . . Provided, that any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or
administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officers
thereof...
This statute imposes a duty upon the union member to exhaust his intra-union
remedies before suing the union, which is not surprising. The duty of fair
representation is akin to a fiduciary duty. Our jurisprudence historically has
required that before a beneficiary may sue the trustee he must allow the trustee
the opportunity to cure the defect. A stockholder must seek a remedy through
the board of directors before he may file a derivative suit against those directors
(Continued on next page)
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The crux of the decision, however, does not lie in the test enunciated
above. Rather, the Court's holding that employee claims for breach
of the duty of fair representation are not pre-empted by the NLRB
and may be litigated in the courts presents a difficult problem for
union officials.60 If the union decides not to arbitrate a particular
grievance, it exposes itself to potential liability. Even if no liability
is found, the expense of defending the suit is extremely high. Since
the cost of arbitration would probably be substantially less, the union
is well advised to arbitrate even though it believes the claim lacks
merit. This indirectly deprives the union of discretion as to whether
it should arbitrate a particular grievance. Moreover, the union, as
bargaining agent for a large group of employees, is restricted in its
ability to bargain away the rights of a single employee when such
action would inure to the benefit of the group as a whole. Clearly,
the overriding emphasis for the union in the negotiation and adminis-
tration of a labor contract is the interest of the entire group with due
regard for individual rights.01 The holding in Vaca shifts the balance
toward the protection of individual rights and away from the interests
of the consummate group.
To assure the efficacy of labor-arbitration, the courts have estab-
lished a system of law to administer the respective rights of employers,
unions, and employees whenever one of them wishes to invoke the
contract grievance procedures.62 To provide stability and predict-
ability to the arbitral process, the courts recognize only two parties
as competent to invoke the contract grievance procedures-unions and
employers. Concomitantly, the courts have expanded the doctrine of
the union's duty of fair representation to protect employees from
arbitrary union refusal to prosecute employee grievances.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
or on behalf of the corporation. Analytically, the stockholder-corporation
relationship is the same as the employee-union relationship. Hence, exhaustion of
intra-union remedies is not an unrealistic requirement.
60 386 U.S. at 182-83.
01 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAv. L. REv. 601, 606-11
(1956). See also Feller, supra note 15, at 806 where he argues that the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement intend to give the union the power to bargain
away individuals' rights if by so doing, the group will benefit or analogously, by
not so doing, the effect on the other employees will be adverse.
62 Again, it must be emphasized that this system of laws fulfills the prophecy
by many that judicial intrusion into the labor-arbitration field usurps the powers
of the parties to a labor agreement to work out their own solutions. See text ac-
companying notes 15-26 supra.
Though seemingly restricting the courts' role in the arbitral process in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court, in fact, laid the groundwork for further
judicial intrusion in the field. The culmination of these decisions in Boys Markets v.
Retail Clerks Union led to a vast narrowing of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
effect of Norris-LaGuardia is virtually restricted to those periods of time between
the expiration of the labor contract and its subsequent renewal.
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C. National Labor Relations Board Deferral to Arbitration.
In order to complete this historical overview of labor arbitration,
it is necessary to consider the NLRB's relationship to the arbitral
process. The Board derives its power from the Labor-Management
Relations Act. Briefly, its function is to protect the rights of em-
ployers, employees and unions created under the Act. The Board
can seek injunctions, issue cease and desist orders, reinstate em-
ployees, and order payments of back wages; however, since the Board
is not vested with any power to enforce its orders, it must seek enforce-
ment through the circuit courts of appeal.
Any discussion of the relationship of the NLRB to the arbitral
process must begin with the Board's seminal decision in Collyer In-
sulated Wire63 [hereinafter cited as Collyer]. The union filed unfair
labor practice charges alleging that the employer violated Sections
8(a)(1)64 and 8(a) (5)65 of the Act by unilaterally changing certain
wage rates and working conditions. The Trial Examiner (now the
Administrative Law Judge) found two violations of Section 8(a) (5).
However, the NLRB in a three to two decision held that this dispute
arose entirely from the contract and required the parties to utilize
the contract grievance procedure to settle their dispute.66 Although
the power of the Board to defer to an arbitral award had been well-
established, 67 never before had the Board deferred to arbitration
before one of the parties had invoked the contract grievance procedure.
For its justification of this radical innovation the Board relied upon
the series of cases beginning with Lincoln Mills and concluding with
Boys Markets.68 Having found a congressional and judicial preference
for arbitration as the desired forum for resolving labor disputes, the
NLRB reasoned that if a dispute is arguably covered by both the
collective bargaining agreement and the Act, then the grievance
arbitration procedure is the preferred method for resolution of the
dispute.
63 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (Aug. 20, 1971).
64 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with the rights of the employees to bargain
collectively.
65 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of
the employees.
66The Board relied upon its decision in Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175
N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1968) where the Board deferred to an arbitrator's
award on the issue of whether or not the employer could unilaterally change the
rest period operations. This activity arguably could be the subject of 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) charges.
67 Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
68 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1987-38 (Aug. 20, 1971).
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Support for Collyer and its policy preference for arbitration has
come from many sources. The supporting arguments, however, recog-
nize other reasons for deferring to arbitration, 69 foremost among which
is the greater competency of the arbitrator to decide cases involving
the "law of the shop." Authority for this viewpoint can be found in
the oft-quoted language of Mr. Justice Douglas:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon
productivity or a particular result, its consequence to the morale
of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished. For the parties' objective in using the arbitration
process is primarily to further their common goal of uninterrupted
production under the agreement, to make the agreement serve
their specialized needs.
70
The Board retained jurisdiction in Collyer to ensure that the
arbitration hearing and result would satisfy the standards set forth in
Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 71 By so doing, the Board can assure
that all parties will receive a fair and impartial hearing and that no
party will be prejudiced by an incompetent or unknowledgeable
arbitrator. The Board further restricted the extent to which it would
defer to arbitration by requiring evidence that the unilateral action
taken by the employer was not designed to undermine the union, but
was based upon "substantial claims for contractual privilege'.72
OD Schatzld, NLRB Resolution of Contract Disputes Under Section 8(aX5), 50
TExAS L. BEv. 225 (1972).
70 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 863 U.S.
574,582 (1960).
71 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955). The Board
will defer to an arbitral award where it appears that:
1. The proceedings were fair and regular;
2. All parties agreed to be bound;
8. The decision of the arbitrator is not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policy of the Act.
72Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 142, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472,
1474-75 (1969). See also Menard, The National Labor Relations Board-No
Longer a Threat to the Arbitral Process, 23 LAB. L.J. 140, 151 (1972) which
applauds the Collyer rule but cautions that deferral should not result where it
appears that the employer conduct complained of "forms an integral part of a
pattern of overall anti-union activity" and where it appears that the issue raised
is specifically excluded from arbitration.
Cf. Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 80 L.R.R.M. 1481 (June
30, 1972) where the Board remanded to arbitration a wage and hour dispute
despite a contractual provision excluding same from arbitration.
1974]
Km-Tucxy LAw JouRNAL
Since Collyer the Board has further explained its standards for
deferral. In Malrite of Wisconsin, Inc.73 an employer refused to abide
by an arbitrator's award, thereby provoking the union to file a charge
with the Board alleging violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. The
Board dismissed the complaint issued by the Regional Director on
the grounds that the courts, and not the NLRB, are the proper forum
for seeking enforcement of arbitral awards. The Board explained
that the "Spielberg standards" apply to the entire arbitral process,
including judicial enforcement of the award. Thus, only after the
union had sought judicial enforcement could it come to the Board for
review.
In National Radio Co., Inc.74 the NLRB deferred to arbitration on
several charges, including the suspension and subsequent discharge
of the union president. Though expanding Collyer to include alleged
Section 8(a) (3)75 violations, the Board concluded that the con-
tractual provision requiring "just cause" for any discharge would force
the arbitrator to consider the possibility of discrimination and anti-
union bias.76 Again, the Board retained jurisdiction pursuant to
Spielberg to assure fundamental fairness in the proceedings and a
decision not wholly "repugnant to the purposes and policy of the
Act."77
In Teamsters Local 7078 an employer fled charges with the Board
alleging that the union violated Section 8(b) (3)79 of the Act when
it directed its members, truck drivers for the employer, to cease
making cash collections on all deliveries or pick-ups. The employer
alleged that this was a unilateral change in the terms and conditions
73 198 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 80 L.R.R.M. 1593 (July 18, 1972). See also Wrought
Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 80 L.R.R.M. 1289 (May 24, 1972); Titus-
Will Ford Sales, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1289 (May 26, 1972).
74 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (July 31, 1972).
7529 U.S.C. § 158(a ( 3) (1970) provides in part that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate against any employee on account
of union activity.76 See Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963) where the
Board first ruled that an arbitral award upholding the discharge of two employees
is not determinative of an unfair labor practice charge alleging that those two
employees were discriminatorily discharged for protected union activity.77
In Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 280 L cRR.M. 174 (y 31,
1972) the Board refused to defer to arbitration in a ischarge case where evidence
was adduced that the business agent for the Union requested the discharge of the
employee. Upon these facts the Board felt that
[ilt would be repugnant to the purpose of the Act to defer to
arbitration in this case as to do so would relegate the Charging Parties to
an arbitral process authored, administered, and invoked entirely by parties
hostile to their interests. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2 at 5, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1746.
78198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (July 31, 1972).
7929 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970) provides that it shall he an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to refuse to bargain with an employer.
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of employment as set out in the collective bargaining agreement. The
employer further charged the union with violating Section 8(b)(1)
(A)80 of the Act by threatening drivers with disciplinary action,
including fines and loss of union membership, if they continued mak-
ing cash collections. The NLRB deferred to arbitration because if the
union action was a change in the terms and conditions of employment
as defined in the collective bargaining agreement, then the arbitrator
could decide this issue and award an appropriate remedy. Applying
the Collyer rationale, the Board concluded that arbitral interpretation
and application of the contract to this dispute would also decide the
unfair labor practice issue.
In Mailer's Union81 the Board again deferred to arbitration a
complaint filed by an employer alleging that the union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(B) 82 of the Act when the union fined one of its
members, a foreman for the employer, twenty-five dollars for per-
forming an act within the scope of his supervisory function. The
employer argued that this union discipline resulted in a restraint
on the employer's right to select its representatives for purposes of
collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. The Board
concluded that arbitral determination of the scope of the foreman's
supervisory duties, as defined in the collective bargaining agreement,
would be a sufficient adjudication of the unfair labor practice issue,
thereby warranting Board deferral to arbitration.
The Teamsters Local 70 and Mailer's Union cases represent the
first time the Board deferred to arbitration for adjudication of
employer instituted unfair labor practice charges. Assuming arguendo,
the efficacy of the deferral policy, then requiring the employer to
submit to the arbitral process, as the Board has required the unions
to do in 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) charges, is only fair and
reasonable.
Taking its cue from the Supreme Court decisions in The Steel-
workers Trilogy, Lincoln Mills, and Boys Markets, the Board has de-
ferred deciding unfair labor practice charges until the contract
grievance procedures have been exhausted. Member Fanning, in his
dissent in Collyer, however, objected to the application of those
cases to cases where unfair labor practice charges have been filed.
8029 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization "to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights" to bargain collectively.
81 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 81 L.R.R.M. 1310 (Oct. 18, 1972).
8229 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I) B) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organzation to restrain or coerce an employer in the selection




He notes that those cases dealt with the courts' relationship to
arbitration whereas the Board's relationship with the arbitral process
is an entirely different matter.83 In any event, the Collyer rule seems
to be well entrenched with the Board. Since the Board's decision to
assert jurisdiction over a particular case is at least partially discre-
tionary, the basic principle of discretionary deference to arbitration
would probably withstand appeals to the judiciary. The policy to
force parties to a labor contract to settle their disputes according to
their own agreed upon methods has received such wide acceptance
by the judiciary that overruling the Collyer principle by the courts
appears quite remote.
D. Section 502 Limits on Arbitrable Issues.
Section 502 of the Act provides in part:
Nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in
good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work
at the place of employment of such employee or employees be
deemed a strike under this chapter.84
Supervisory personnel for the Knight-Morley Corporation dis-
charged several employees for walking off their jobs without per-
mission. The union filed charges with the Board which ultimately
ordered that the employees be reinstated. When the employer
refused to abide by the Board's decision, the Board sought enforce-
ment of its order in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Basing its
decision on Section 502 of the Act, the Sixth Circuit determined that
the employees had walked off their jobs under a good faith belief
that abnormally dangerous working conditions existed at their plant.
83 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1942-43 (Aug. 20, 1971). See
Atleson, Disciplinary D~scharges, Arbitration and N.L.R.B. Deference, 20 BurrFA.o
L. REv. 355, 357 (1971) which agrees with Member Fanning that a policy of
non-deference would neither undermine nor interfere with arbitration since the
focus of the Board is statutory, not contractual.
See also Lodge 143, IAM v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964)
where the court held that despite the execution of an arbitration submission agree-
ment allowing for final and binding arbitration to determine the rights of striking
employees, the union, nevertheless, could file and maintain unfair labor practice
charges with the Board in contravention of the agreement. The court said,
This public interest in preventing unfair labor practices can not be en-
tirely foreclosed by a purely private arrangement, no matter how at-
tractive the arrangement may appear to the individual participants.
Id. at 9.
Cf. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, 391 U.S. 418 (1967) where the Court commented:
A healthy interplay of the forces governed and protected by the Act
means that there should be as great a freedom to ask the Board for relief
as there is to petition any other department of government for a redress
of grievances .... [w]e agree that the overriding public interest makes
unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy alternative.... Id. at 424.
8429 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
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The court then held that the employer discharged the employees for
protected 5 union activity and ordered the enforcement of the Board's
order.
In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW 6 the Supreme Court balanced the
§ 502 protection against the arbitration mandate of the Steelworkers
Trilogy. A partial blockage of an intake airway into the employer's
mine shaft reduced the airflow into the mine, increasing the danger
of accumulated dust, flammable gases and possible explosion. The
blockage was not detected because of faulty readings recorded in a
log book by the employer's foremen. The Union voted not to work
so long as the negligent foremen were responsible for safety. In a suit
under § 301 the district court compelled arbitration and ordered the
foremen suspended pending resolution. On appeal, the Third Circuit
reversed saying:
Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordinary
disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to submit mat-
ters of life or death to arbitration and no enlightened society en-
courages, much less requires them to do so.... The arbitrator is
not staking his life on his impartial decision. It should not be the
policy of the law to force the employees to stake theirs on his
judgment.87
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no specific inclusion
was necessary to make safety disputes arbitrable where broad arbitra-
tion clauses exist.8 8 Section 502 operates to protect safety strikes from
Boys Market injunctions when employees have a good faith belief
that abnormally dangerous working conditions exist.8 9 Nevertheless,
this dispute was arbitrable because of the broad coverage of the
grievance-arbitration clause.
Clearly, the Supreme Court has reasserted its support for the policy
of arbitration found in the Steelworkers Trilogy. A resulting difficulty
is the effect that Gateway will have on the Board's deferral policy.
As illustrated by Knight-Morley and other decisions,90 the Board his-
85 NLRB v. Knight-Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 927 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
86 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
87 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3rd Cir. 1972).
88 94 S. Ct. at 636.
89 The Court indicated that a Boys Market injunction may not issue if it is
adduced that an abnormal hazard in fact exists. Hence, as to the issuance of an
injunction, a good faith belief requires also that the hazard exists in fact; but, § 502
protection may be required even if no hazard exists in fact if the safety strikers
have good faith belief in abnormally dangerous working conditions. In this
situation § 502 would protect the strikers from discharge.
90 See also Machaby v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1967); Marble Products
Co. v. Storeworkers Local 155, 335 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1964); Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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torically has protected safety strikers from discharge by their em-
ployers. Now, it appears that since the safety disputes are arbitrable
the Board may decide also that employee discharges as a result of
safety strikes may also be arbitrable. The problems here are com-
plicated. Though the issuance of a Boys Market injunction depends
upon a safety hazard in fact not existing, § 502 may operate to protect
safety strikers from discharge so long as their belief is in good faith.
E. Summary of Historical Background.
Section 301 of the Act provides the impetus for judicial and
administrative recognition of the arbitral process as the primary
method for settling labor disputes. Reading that section for the first
time, one could hardly predict that it would spawn an entire new
body of law which expresses a preference for arbitration in the
settlement of labor disputes and provides standards by which arbitral
awards are judged and methods for enforcing them. Safeguards have
been established to protect the rights of employees who, peculiarly,
are not parties to a labor contract. This trend toward arbitration has
seeped in to the Board procedures for administration of unfair labor
practice charges, and yet, not an approving, dissenting or explanatory
word has been provided by Congress since the passage of Section 301
in 1947.
II. TBE PowER OF TlE ARBITRATOR
A. Limitations on the Arbitrator's Power to Consider Public Laws.
The arbitrator must render the mutual intent of the parties whether
or not he approves of that intent. He must ascertain that intent
... from the record made by the parties themselves, as presented
at the arbitration hearing.... The arbitrator must be bound by the
agreement and may not reform it by adding to or subtracting
from its written provisions. 91
This conception of the proper role of the arbitrator is held by
many of the more traditional commentators in the labor-arbitration
field. It requires that the arbitrator look no further than the contract
between the parties to resolve disputes. Whether there has been a
breach of a contractual duty and which remedy the arbitrator may
impose are questions determinable solely by reference to the collective
bargaining agreement. This perception of the role of the arbitrator
would require the arbitrator to ignore the law and decide the case
according to the contract,92 and only the courts could determine
91 p. PRASOW & E. P=rETS, ARBITRATION AND CoLLEcTIvE BAncAmn&NG: CON-
FLIcT RESOLUTION IN LABOR RELATIONS 12 (1970).
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whether the contract contravenes some higher authority or law.
Dean Shulman supported this view when, speaking of arbitrators, he
commented
He is rather a system of self-government created by and confined
to the parties. He serves their pleasure only, to administer the
rule of law established by their collective agreement. They are
entitled to demand that, at least on balance, his performance be
satisfactory to them, and they can readily dispense with him if it
is not.
9 3
In Eaton Manufacturing Co.94 the arbitrator tacitly approved the
above characterization of his role when he held that it was beyond his
contractual authority and jurisdiction to effectuate the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law in contravention of the collective bargaining
agreement. The inconsistency of this view with the Collyer rationale
is obvious. If an arbitrator is restricted to the conditions and terms
of the contract, he is powerless to consider public law, but Collyer
requires that any arbitral award which is reviewed by the Board not
be "repugnant to the purposes and policy of the Act." Analytically,
the only explanation is that the arbitrator should render his decision
in conformity with his contractual restrictions independently of the
public law. If public law is violated by the contract and award, then
the judiciary or the Board could vacate or disregard the award. At
any rate, the arbitrator performs his function by properly interpreting
the contract and restricting himself to that contract. At that point the
judiciary and the NLRB could apply the public law and declare the
contract, or any part thereof, illegal.
Consider Steel & Iron Association v. Shopmen's Local 54795 where
the Third Circuit declared that it was against public policy to uphold
an arbitral award enjoining the employer from appealing to the Pay
Board the wage rates it had contracted for with the union. The
court cited a Ninth Circuit decision, San Martine Compania de
Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Limited,96 as authority for
the proposition that arbitral awards may be vacated when clearly
violative of a higher law. In neither case do the courts say that an
arbitrator must consider public law; rather, they hold an arbitral
award will not be enforced if repugnant to public law. This char-
acterization of the issues by the Third and Ninth Circuits seems to
support the traditionalists' insistence upon arbitral consideration of
92 Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration in NA-
TIoNAL ACADEMY OF ABnrrAToas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITLATORs (1967).
93 Shulman, supra note 29 at 1016.
9466-3 ARB IT 9089 (1966).
95 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 46 (3d Cir. 1973).96293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1973).
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the collective bargaining agreement, alone, and letting the courts
and the Board decide public law application. Since one of the reasons
for the preference for arbitration is that it is speedier, it is imperative
that the arbitrator be empowered to resolve all issues pertaining to
the collective bargaining agreement, including legality of the agree-
ment and the power to interpret the agreement so as not to violate
public laws. Otherwise, the arbitral process would be encumbered
with an arbitral hearing and subsequent Board or judicial application
of public laws.
In opposition to Meltzer's orthodox view, liberals maintain that
arbitrators have a responsibility to consider statutes that affect the
interpretation or application of a term in the collective bargaining
agreement 7 This theory is interwoven with the NLRB's decision in
Collyer. For deferral to be effective an arbitrator necessarily must
probe for statutory violations. If the arbitrator fails to consider the
statutes, the Board would be obligated to review the arbitral decisions
in a great number of cases. 8 In this situation arbitration would simply
add an unnecessary step to the decision-making process.
Equally as compelling as the Collyer rationale for Howlett's con-
ception of the proper role of the arbitrator is the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.99 There, a grievant processed
his claim through the arbitral process resulting in an adverse award.
Subsequently, he sued in federal district court alleging that his dis-
charge violated Title VII of the Civil Bights Act of 1964.100 The
Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and commented:
Where the grievances are based on an alleged civil rights violation,
and the parties consent to arbitration... the arbitrator has a right
to finally determine them.
. . . [We find [no] national policy for ousting arbitrators of juris-
diction to finally determine grievances initiated by employees,
based on alleged violation of their civil rights. 1S1
97Howlett, The Arbitrator, The NLRB and the Courts in NATIoNAL AcADEMNry
OF ARBrrRATORS, PROCEEDINGS OF T TwENTIETH ANNUAL MEETrnG OF THE NA-
TIONAL AcADEMy OF ABrrRATORS 67 (1967).
9829 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1973) provides for a six month statute of limitations on
all unfair labor practice charges. If a party relying upon Collyer and its progeny,
were to seek arbitration of a dispute arguably covered by the Act, he cold
jeopardize his position by not also filing unfair labor practice charges. For
example an arbitrator could decide that the controversy is not arbitrable, but
rather should properly be before the NLRB. If no unfair labor practice charges
have been filed, the case may be barred after the arbitral determination that it is
an unfair labor practice.
99 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
100 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (1970).
101 429 F.2d at 332. See generally Goss, The Labor Arbitrator's Role: Tradi-
(Continued on next page)
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Considering the importance of civil rights in this country, national
policy compels not only due process, but also correctness of decisions
in civil rights cases. Ergo, arbitrators entrusted with civil rights
cases should be empowered to consider the Civil Rights Act.
To further complicate matters, consider Hutchings v. United States
Industries, Inc.10 2 where the Fifth Circuit held that the doctrine of
election of remedies applies in Title VII cases "only to the extent
that a plaintiff is not entitled to duplicate relief in the public and
private forums which would result in an unjust enrichment or windfall
to him."103 The court reasoned that rights and remedies in the labor-
arbitration process are different from "those involved in judicial pro-
ceedings under Title VII,"104 and, echoing the sentiments of the
traditionalists, concluded:
[t]he arbitrator's role ... is to carry out the aims of the agreement
that he has been commissioned to interpret and apply ...
,.. [t]he arbitrator ... may consider himself constrained to
apply the contract and not give types of remedies available under
Title VII .... 105
Hence, the plaintiff was allowed to maintain his suit alleging violation
of the Civil Rights Act even though he had already received an adverse
award in an arbitration concerning the same issue.
The basis of the controversy concerning the power of an arbitrator
to consider public law is the lack of any definitive judicial or legislative
statement of policy. Reacting to judicial uncertainty and legislative
inaction, arbitrators have been unable to formulate their own policy
regarding the consideration of statutes in the arbitral process despite
the trend for replacing the courts with arbitration as the prime method
for resolving labor disputes.100
B. Contractual Limitations Upon An Arbitrator.
Typically, labor contracts afford arbitrators broad remedial powers,
e.g., reinstatement and back pay for wrongfully discharged employees,
modification of punitive action taken by a company against an
employee, and ordering an employer to discontinue a harsh work
rule regarding broad areas such as overtime, seniority, job classifica-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tion and Change, 25 Ann. J. 221, 227 (1970) where Goss comments that the labor
arbitration process could be undermined if the arb'tration and the courts are
guided by different laws and the results differ depending on the forum.
102 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
103 428 F.2d at 314.
104 Id. at 311.
105 Id. at 812.
100 See Goss, supra note 101 at 231.
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tion and job bidding. However, frequently labor contracts restrict
arbitral remedial powers, and it is necessary to point out some of
these problems in order to understand arbitral power. In Magnavox
Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers07
the court vacated an arbitrator's award because the arbitrator ex-
ceeded his contractual limitations in determining whether the grievant
reasonably believed that a health hazard existed. The collective
bargaining agreement restricted the arbitrator to a determination
of whether a serious health hazard in fact existed. Only after
such a determination could the grievant rely upon the health
hazard as a defense to a discharge for refusal to obey orders.108
In Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co.109 the court
vacated an arbitrator's finding that there was just cause for the com-
pany to suspend but not discharge the grievant. The court interpreted
the collective bargaining agreement as restricting the arbitrator's
power to a determination of only whether just cause for discharge
existed, not just cause for any other disciplinary action. However, the
Fourth Circuit overruled this decision in Lynchburg Foundry Co. v.
Steelworkers Local 2556,110 holding that arbitral determination of the
propriety of a particular punishment for employee misconduct is
"routinely grist for the arbitral mill."11
Olin Corp. v. Electrical Workers Local 369112 provides an example
of the extensive power of an arbitrator. The grievant was discharged
for starting a fight with another employee; the other employee, how-
ever, was only suspended. The arbitrator held that the grievant
should have been given the same punishment as the other employee,
i.e., suspension, and ordered the grievant reinstated with full back pay
from the time the suspension would have terminated, which amounted
to nearly five thousand dollars. In the interim between the order of
reinstatement and the time the suspension should have ended, the
grievant earned over five thousand dollars at another job. The Sixth
Circuit rejected the employer's argument that as a matter of law the
107 287 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Tenn. 1968), affirmed, 410 F.2d 388 (6th Cir.
1969).
108 Though not presented with a § 502 issue, the Sixth Circuit still seems to
contradict its holding in NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.
1957). See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra. In Knight-Morley the court
held that employees were entitled to walk off their jobs if they had a good faith
belief that they were working under abnormally dangerous conditions. Good faith
belief necessarily implies that abnormally dangerous conditions do not in fact have
to exist. Only the good faith belief must be clear.
109 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
110 404 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1968). See the discussion of these cases in Dunau,
Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427 (1969).
111 See generally F. Eucouru & E. ELxouPm, How AaBrrnriAoN Worts 419-41
(1961).
112 471 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1972).
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grievant's interim earnings should be set off against his lost wages. 13
The court looked to the collective bargaining agreement and found
that it provided for certain setoffs in case of back pay awards but that
these setoffs did not include interim wage earnings. The court con-
cluded that general contract law requiring mitigation was not ap-
plicable, thereby allowing the arbitrator to award full back pay without
setting off interim earnings. 114 The court remanded the case to the
arbitrator to determine whether interim earnings should be set off,
and the arbitrator decided that the grievant was entitled to full back
pay. As illustrated by this case, an arbitrator's power to determine
the "law of the shop" and award remedies for violation of that law is
expansive. Though in the idyllic sense the arbitrator derives his
power from the collective bargaining agreement, the law spawned
by Section 301 of the Act and the courts has given some measure of
independence to the arbitrator without which his influence on the
dispute-resolution process would be greatly reduced. Very narrow
limits within which arbitral awards are reviewable by the courts
and the NLRB has conferred upon the arbitrator weighty responsi-
bility to be fair, decisive, and impartial to all parties to the collective
bargaining agreement
Unfortunately, the arbitrator's perception of his own role is con-
fused. 115 Caught between the traditional confines of the contract
and the increasing legislation which confers and withdraws rights to
employees, arbitrators have not fully recognized their ever more
significant place in the labor arena. An insight to some of the reasons
for this situation may be found in the arbitrator himself. What kind
of a man becomes a labor arbitrator? Who owns the arbitrator's
"marker," and what effect does this have on the decisions he renders?
HI. MAY IT PLEmE THE ABrrAToR, WHAT MA=xS You Tic?
To understand the nature of the arbitrator it is necessary to
understand where he derives his power and, most importantly, what
influences his decisions. Obviously, since he is not required by law, 116
an arbitrator derives his power in essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement. His powers are negotiated by the employer and
the union just as are wage rates, working hours and day to day rights
and duties of employers and employees. The labor contract can
113 Id. at 471.
114 Id. at 471-72.
115 Goss, supra note 101, at 231.
116 Although in many labor disputes arbitrators are required by law, in the
private sector they are not. Generally, those areas where arbitration is required
are public employment and the railroad and airline industries. See Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(f) (1970) where arbitration is required for all minor dis-
putes between employers and employees covered by this Act.
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limit arbitral discretion or expand it to the point where it is nearly
limitless. Hence, the arbitrator's power to judge discretionary deci-
sions of employers and employees and to afford a wide range of
remedies for abuses of discretion depends entirely upon what the
parties negotiated and agreed to in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. As Dean Shulman so aptly put it:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not
a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority
which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter
to administer justice for a community which transcends the parties.
He is rather a system of self-government created by and confined
to the parties.117
Though Congress and the courts have encouraged employers
and unions to utilize the arbitrator, problems have arisen over his
dependence on the parties to a labor contract. The arbitrator is not
imposed upon the parties, rather he is chosen by them. Typically, a
labor contract will provide that an arbitrator will be chosen from a
panel named in the contract or provided by a third party.118 From
this panel the parties generally by process of elimination will choose
one man to serve as the arbitrator for a particular dispute. In a few
situations the collective bargaining agreement has named a permanent
arbitrator for all disputes that may arise during the life of the contract.
Of course, upon the expiration of the contract the parties may ne-
gotiate the arbitrator out.
In this state of dependence the arbitrator cannot be wholly
oblivious to the desires of the parties, no matter how irrational they
may be. To maintain credibility with both parties, the arbitrator
must necessarily make compromises. For the arbitrator to hold for
one party in several arbitrations would certainly assure his elimination
by the other in future disputes. Archibald Cox has commented that,
"[a]mong lawyers and judges there is also a widespread belief that
arbitrators make expedient compromises instead of rational deci-
sions."119
The arbitrator's impartiality -suffers by being closely tied to the
contracting parties. The opportunity to compromise issues is most
noticeable when one arbitrator must decide several grievances at the
same hearing which generally arises when a back-log of similar cases
has built up. This provides the arbitrator with the opportunity to
117 Shulman, supra note 29, at 1016.
118 There are many organizations which provide panels of arbitrators from
which one is chosen by the company and the union for a particular dispute, e.g.,
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the American Arbitration
Association. In addition, most major cities have their own arbitration services.




offend no one by splitting his decisions. Of course, often the cases
are not all one way or the other, but it is not unusual for an attorney
to complain that he won the wrong case or lost his sure winner. It
must be mentioned, however, that the accumulation of grievances to
submit to an arbitrator at one hearing is not accidental. First, it does
save money. Secondly, by providing an arbitrator with the opportunity
to throw a few bones to each side, union business agents and company
personnel directors can always show enough "winners" to placate those
people to whom they are responsible. Hence, union and employer
complaints about arbitral compromise are not always justified.
Contributing to the arbitrator's dependency state is the method by
which he is chosen. Typically, a panel of prospective arbitrators is
presented to the parties. From this panel the parties alternatively
strike names from the list until only one is left who serves as the
arbitrator for the particular dispute. A fortiori, rarely is either party
completely satisfied with the chosen arbitrator.
Consideration of the reasons parties eliminate prospective arbitra-
tors is necessary for a complete understanding of the compromise
arbitrators are forced to make.
It is a well known fact that there are commercial organizations
which make it their business to issue ratings on arbitrators and
prospective arbitrators. The standards of judgment used by these
organizations and, therefore, the standards of those who avail
themselves of the services of such organizations, are primarily in
terms of "pro" or "anti" union bias.120
Thus, when choosing arbitrators, unions and employers frequently
are more impressed by the reputed bias of an arbitrator than by his
rationality. Obviously, this results in the selection of an arbitrator
known more for his expedient compromises than for his resolute strong
decisions. Rather than a strong arbitrator, the disputants often choose
the least offensive.
Apologists for this method of choosing arbitrators contend that
there is nothing wrong with arbitrators seeking compromise solutions.
Indeed, compromise and conciliation are the essence of collective
bargaining. From the first negotiating session until the parties sign
the contract, compromises have been made, and nothing is wrong
with compromising after the agreement has been effectuated. Often,
the apologists submit, disputes occur because one party over-reacted
to the other's extreme position in a discipline or harsh work rule
case and neither is wholly right or wrong. The sensitive and percep-
tive arbitrator will seek a compromise that will compensate each
party for the abuses of the other.
120p. HAYEs, LABOR ABBrrBATION 39 (1969).
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Prior to the Lincoln Mills decision in 1957, most labor specialists
acknowledged the compromising and conciliatory role of the arbitrator
as being the most appropriate one. That was an era, however, when
violence was not uncommon in labor disputes, and when the strict
law of the collective agreement and knowledge of the "law of the
shop" supplied all an arbitrator needed to make a wise, judicious
decision. Since that time, however, industrial stability has been
achieved by an ever increasing body of law developed by Congress
and the courts.
Since the federal government's entry into the labor-arbitration
field, the scope of the arbitrator's power has increased enormously.
Paralleling his growth in power has been a growth in the responsibility
of the arbitrator to become expert in numerous areas of the law.
Application of statutory requirements to contractual labor disputes
repeatedly precludes compromise and demands precise application
of statutes and court decisions to factual situations and contract lan-
guage. In areas as potentially volatile as civil rights (including race,
sex, and age discrimination), compromise may result in a denial of
constitutionally protected rights and lead to greater disorder than
existed prior to the arbitral decision.
Yet, arbitrators often have little or no legal background, much
less a sufficient knowledge of the many applicable statutes. Indeed,
many readily admit to a lack of essential knowledge of many statutes
affecting the employer-employee relationship. 21 This group includes
lawyers, as well as non-lawyers. To further complicate matters many
arbitration hearings never involve lawyers, for often the union's
business agent and the employer's personnel director will argue their
cases before an arbitrator, who is also not a lawyer. Hence, frequently
the statutory issues are never raised, and an employee whose conduct
may be contractually prohibited but statutorily protected is disci-
plined. Ensuring conformance to the law and protection of individual
civil rights requires an arbitral expertise and independence that is not
readily available in the labor arbitrator market today.
121 See Note, Authority and Obligation of a Labor Arbitrator to Modify or
Eliminate a Provision of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Because in his Opinion
it Violates Federal Law, 32 Oao ST. L.J. 395, 398 n.16 (1971) where the author
sent out a questionnaire to a group of arbitrators asking that they rate themselves
on their knowledge of the public labor laws. The results follow:
The following is the actual question presented to the members of the
Academy and its results:
Assuming you were authorized to do so, how would you feel about inter-
preting the provisions of a collective-agreement in accordance with the
following statutes. (1) Would feel competent and expert; (2) Would feel




From a few short sentences in section 301(a) & (b) of the Act, a
sprawling labor arbitration bureaucracy has developed.12 2  Where
once the parties to a collective agreement were left to their own
devices to resolve their disputes, there now exists a complex and
sophisticated body of law to decide these issues. Labor disputes and
labor legislation affect everyone in this country.123 The primary target
for those groups beginning to demand rights once denied is the labor
market. Success in this area can virtually eliminate the residual effects
of years of past oppression.
Twenty years ago the identification of the opposing interests in
labor disputes as a duality, union and management, was valid. Today
these disputes involve four separate competing interests: the union,
the employer, the employee, and the public. The mutuality of interests
that once characterized the union-employee relationship no longer
(Footnote continued from preceding page) (1) (2) (3) (4)
National Labor Relations Act .................... 48% 34% 16% 2%
Labor Management Relations Act ...... 48% 34% 16% 2%
Railway Labor Act ................ 24% 41% 32% 3%
Federal Antitrust Statutes .......................... 12% 24% 57% 7%
Norris-La Guardia ...................................... 31% 37% 29% 3%
Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act .......................................... 29% 43% 26% 2%
Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act .............................................. 15% 41% 40% 4%
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII ............ 18% 47% 31% 4%
Fair Labor Standards Act .......................... 25% 45% 26% 4%
Executive Order No. 10988 Employee-
Management Cooperation in the
Federal Service ........................................ 31% 44% 19% 6%
The following were the results of those respondents who indicated
that they were also lawyers (Note: these results were also included in
the total results set out above):
(1) (2) (3) (4)National Labor Relations Act................ 65% 25% 7% 3%
Labor Management Relations Act .............. 65% 25% 7% 3%
Railway Labor Act ...................................... 34% 50% 13% 3%
Federal Antitrust Statutes .......................... 16% 30% 42% 12%
Norris-La Guardia ...................................... 43% 43% 9% 5%
Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ........................................ 39% 44% 12% 5%
Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act .......................................... 23% 53% 16% 8%
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII ............ 23% 58% 13% 6%
Fair Labor Standards Act .......................... 37% 39% 16% 8%
Executive Order No. 10988 Employee-
Management Cooperation in the
Federal Service ........................................ 39% 44% 9% 8%
122 Currently there are several multi-volume sets reporting decisions of
arbitration cases. Moreover, the innumerable organizations which provide
arbitrators immeasureably contribute to the arbitral bureaucracy.
123 With the advent of wage controls this becomes especially true. Daily, the
newspapers report wage disputes and the effects of wage increases on the rest of
our economy.
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exists. To assume that unions and management will always protect
the interest of the employees and the public is pure legal schizo-
phrenia. To assume that arbitrators, wholly dependent upon unions
and employers, will render wise, knowledgeable decisions reflecting
consideration of all interests is utter naivet6.
To properly order the relationships of all four parties in labor
disputes, Congress must enact a new labor-arbitration policy which
considers and protects the interests of all four parties. Industrial
democracy is still the desired objective inasmuch as it reflects the
macrocosm of our culture, 124 and we should continue to encourage
labor disputants to settle their disputes according to their own agreed
upon procedures. However, a new policy should more clearly recog-
nize the public interest in the settlement of labor disputes and in
the results of those settlements.
Our policy should recognize the often dichotomous relationship
of the union and the individual employee. The union has an interest
in group protection, often to the detriment of a single employee's
interest. Due regard should be afforded this interest by providing
a speedy and less expensive forum for resolving employee claims of
breach of the duty of fair representation by the union.
A policy favoring arbitration should be restated with an objective
to release the arbitrator from his dependency upon union and man-
agement. If unions and management provide for arbitration of dis-
putes, they should be required to go to a single source of arbitrators
such as the National Labor Relations Board. The Board could have
lists of approved and qualified arbitrators, from which one could be
selected by the regional director to serve as the arbitrator for a
particular dispute.
By requiring arbitrators to be knowledgeable on all relevant
statutes and court decisions, the Board could then assure greater
protection of rights vested by statute and the Constitution. This
method of choosing arbitrators would assure a greater measure of
protection for the interests of all four affected parties by relasing the
arbitrator from his dependency status and by requiring him to know
and apply public law. This policy would not disrupt existing policy;
rather, it would complement it. The NLRB's policy of deferring to
arbitration would be enhanced by clearly requiring the arbitrators to
apply public law. The preference for arbitration expressed in Section
301 would not only be more credible, but would have its own method
for implementation.
Walter L. Sales
12 4 See Shulman, supra note 29, at 1016.
